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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
REBECCA B. LARRABEE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
ROYAL DA I RY PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
MARY DOROTHY POULSEN, t1ARGARET 
10!1AAITKE11, GERALDINE L. 
HOGAN, CORIJELIA L. HAIKOCK, 
OTTO tiLAl1lE LARRABEE, JR., AND 
WARREN H. LARRABEE, 
Defendants. 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16589 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the interpretation of two written agreements dealing 
11ith real property, an Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P), dated September 7, 
1973, and a Trust (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P), dated November 7, 1973. 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
I. \/as the Agreement of September 7, 1973, an agreement to create 
a revocable trust at a later date and therefore did not grant Defendant-
Respondent, Glenwood Larrabee, a present interest in the Property? 
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2. Were the interests granted to Glenwood Larrabee by the Trust 
of November 7, 1973, extinguished by the subsequent revocation of that t , 
rust] , 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that the Agreement of September 7 1973 9 • , ranted 
an interest in the property to Glenwood Larrabee, and that the revocation of 
the Trust of November 7, 1973, did not revoke that interest granted by the 
September 7, 1973 Agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the 
Agreement of September 7, 1973, and of the Trust of November 7, 1973. 
Appellant contends that the trial court's construction was clearly erroneous 
in light of the intentions of the parties expressed in the Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rebecca B. Larrabee, the Plaintiff-Appellant, is the owner of real 
property hereinafter referred to as "the property" consisting of Lots 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Block 2, Dieter and Johnson, Main Street Addition, as 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, together with 
all improvements thereon. 
On September 7, 1973, Mrs. Larrabee and her children executed 
an Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement", Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4-P) in which the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to cause title to "the property" 
to be conveyed to Otto, Warren, and Glenwood Larrabee, three of her children, 
-2-
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as trustees of a revocable trust, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff-Appellant 
during her l ifetirne and for distribution to her children upon termination of 
the trust. "The Agreement" also set forth the terms under which the trust 
estate was to be distributed to the children. Other terms not dealing with 
the contemplated trust were also contained in "the Agreement". 
Pursuant to the terms of "the Agreement" on November 7, 1973, Plaintiff-
Appellant executed a revocable trust (hereinafter referred to as "the Trust" 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P), wherein she conveyed "the Property" to Otto Blaine 
Larrabee, Jr., Glenwood IL Larrabee, and Warren H. Larrabee, jointly as 
"Trustee". "The Trust" provisions set forth that the Truster had reserved 
the right to revoke "the Trust" and also provided for distribution of the 
Trust Estate. "The Trust" provided as fol lows: 
(c) Distribution Upon Termination. Upon the termination 
of the Trust, Trustee shall distribute the residue of the Trust 
Estate to MARY DOROTHY POULSrn, MARGARET IOl~E AITKEN, GERALDINE 
L. HOGAI~, CORl~ELIA L. HANCOCK, OTTO SLAINE LARRABEE, JR., 
GLENWOOD ll. LARRABEE, and WARREN H. LARRABEE, or if any of such 
persons are deceased, to the surviving issue of them by right 
of representation, in equal shares, provided that said equal 
shares shall be modified in accordance with the provisions of 
an Agreement between the Trustor and her children, dated the 
7th day of September, 1973. (A copy of which Agreement is 
attached to this Trust Agreement, and by reference is incor-
porated herein.) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P, p.2. 
On or about October 20, 1977, Mrs. Larrabee, through a letter bearing 
the same date from her attorney (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P) notified Mr. Glenwood 
Larrabee that she had revoked the Trust Agreement of November 7, 1973. She 
also signed a statement to the same effect on January 18, 1978. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3-P) 
-3-
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Plaintiff-Appellant brought this action herein for ad I 
ec a ratory 
judgment, seeking to have the Court declare the Agreement of s t b 
e p em er 7, I j)l, , 
"null and void and of no effect". Complaint p. 3. The case was tried to the 
Court on April 6, 1979, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Court 
Judge. The Agreement of September 7, 1973, was placed into evidence together 
with the Trust Agreement of November 7, 1973. The Statement of Revocation dat: 
January 18, 1978, and the Letter of Revocation dated October 20, 1977, were 
also placed into evidence. 
The Court found that "The revocable Trust Agreement was revoked, but 
such revocation did not revoke the agreement of the parties". Record, p. 82, 
From that Judgment, the Plaintiff-Appellant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POltH I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGREEMENT OF 
SEPTEMBER 7, 1973, GRANTED GLENWOOD LARRABEE AN INTEREST II~ 
THE PROPERTY. 
The trial court, in finding that Glenwood Larrabee continued to have 
an interest in the property subsequent to the revocation of the Trust of 
November 7, 1973, based its finding on the interpretation that Glenwood 
Larrabee was granted an interest in the property under the terms of the 
Agreement of September 7, 1973. Record, p. 84. Th is construct ion is 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
contrary to the intent of the parties as expressed within the Agreement itself.I 
The parties clearly intended the provisions of the Agreement of September/,l':·1 
dealing with the Trust, to be only an Agreement to make a future trust and not I 
to grant any interest in the property. I The trial court's construction of the 1 
Agreement of September 7, 1973, is in error. 
! 
1 
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In construing contracts, the standard of interpretation has been set 
out by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thomas J. Peck and Sons, Inc. v. 
~Rock Products, Inc. 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 466 (1973). In itemizing the 
basic principles of contract law, the Court said: 
The most fundamental of these is that the meaning and 
effect to be given a contract depends upon the intent of the 
parties and that this is to be ascertained by looking at the 
entire contract, and all of its parts in their relationship to 
each other. 
515 P.2d at 448. 
The intent of the parties is clearly shown within the four corners 
of the Agreement of September 7, 1973. The parties stated in the recitals 
that: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto wish to provide for the 
maintenance, operation, and possible future distribution 
of said property by this agreement. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, p.2. 
because: 
The Agreement further shows that the Agreement had been necessary 
..• Glenwood has operated the property, sometimes using a 
corporate form, but primarily for his own benefit, and has 
paid or obligated himself to pay as rent therefor, an amount 
which now appears to be inadequate and which is delinquent. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, p. 2. 
The Agreement also sets forth Glenwood's reason for executing the 
Agreement. The Agreement further states: 
WHEREAS, Glenwood has been in possession of the 
property since 1952, and has made substantial improvemen~s 
to it upon an understanding that he would have the benefit 
of any excess in the value of the property over $62,000.00 
(being the original agreed value of the property of 
$57,000.00 plus $5,000.00 cash reserve in Royal Dairy, used 
by Glenwood in connection with said improvements). 
-5-
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P 1 a inti ff' s Exhibit 4-P, p. 1. 
Rebecca Larrabee's reasons for executing the Agreement are also 
stated explicitly. The recitals show that: 
Rebecca is the owner of substantially all of the stock 
of Royal Dairy and of the fol lowing described real property 
hereinafter referred to as "the Property": 
Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of Block 2, DIETER 
and JOHNSON, Main Street Addition, as recorded in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, together 
with all improvements thereon. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, p. 1. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the Agreement as set 
forth in the Agreement itself can be summarized as fol lows: Rebecca Larrabee 
owned the property upon which Glenwood Larrabee was operating a business. 
Glenwood Larrabee had made substantial improvements in the property, believin~ 
that he was entitled to the value of the property less its value at the date 
he began the improvements, but, that he had failed to stay current in his 
rent payments. The parties were concerned also, that the rent income from 
the property was inadequate. The parties, in order to solve the problems 
existing regarding the property, entered into the Agreement in order toprovia; 
for the maintenance and operation of the property and for the possible future 
disposition of the property. 
The Appel ]ant maintains that the trial cou~t ~ai l~d to be gu'.ded by, I 
the intent of all of the parties to the Agreement 1n its 1nterpretat1onof.th»I 
Agreement. The trial court's interpretation cannot be justified when the int< 
of all of the parties is considered. 
The trial court should have found, and we urge this Court to find, tn<: 
the Agreement of September 7, 1973, was a multi-phase agreement setting fortli 
a complex plan for the settlement of al 1 disputes with respect to the propert. 
-6- 1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and for the future maintenance, operation, and possible future distribution 
of the property. 
Paragraph I of the Agreement clearly and explicitly states the 
Agreement of Rebecca Larrabee with respect to the property in question. 
Although she owned the property outright, she agreed to transfer ownership to 
three of her sons, Otto, Warren and Glenwood, as trustees of a revocable trust. 
This revocable transfer and trust was to be: 
For the use and benefit of Rebecca during her 1 ifetime 
and for distribution to her children upon her death or after 
September 1, 1976, whichever last occurs. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, p.2. This provision clearly coincides with the 
intent of al 1 of the parties. The parties must have decided that the operation 
of the Property by three sons as Trustees as opposed to the sole operation by 
Glenwood, was the proper method to provide for the maintenance and operation 
of the property. The fact that the transfer was to be by way of a revocable 
trust also coincides with the implied wish of Rebecca to provide for the 
maintenance and operation of the Property without giving up entirely her complete 
ownership of the Property. 
The provisions contained in Paragraph 1 of the Agreement are clear and 
unambiguous and, when construed in light of her intent as stated in the Agreement, 
those provisions can only be construed to be a promise by Rebecca Larrabee to 
create a trust in the future. She agreed "to cause tit le to the property to be 
transferred " In "the Agreement" she made no present transfer of the 
property in trust. The terms of Paragraph 1 explicitly state that a Trust 
was to be created in the future. 
-?-
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The effect of Rebecca Larrabee's promise is well settled under the 
law of trusts. Her promise created no present trust. Th O s ' e regon upreme Coun , 
in quoting 1 Scott, Trusts, 162 Section 26, in the case of Claude v. Claude,ni 
P.2d 776, (Ore. 1951), stated the applicable law: 
If an owner of property declares his intention to create 
a trust to the property in the future, or promises that he 
wi 11 create such a trust, whether by transferring property 
to another as trustee, or by constituting himself trustee, 
no trust is presently created. Although a manifestation of 
intention to create a trust is all that is needed for its 
creation, it must be a manifestation of intention to create 
a present trust and not merely to create a trust to arise 
at some future time. 
228 P.2d at 789. Since no present trust was created by the Agreement of 
September 7, 1973, not unti 1 the execution of the subsequent Trust Agreement 
did any trustee or beneficiary obtain any interest, whether vested or continger· 
in the property. The tit le to the property remained in Rebecca Larrabee until 
the execution of the Trust Agreement. 
The Agreement of September 7, 1973, after setting forth Rebecca 
Larrabee's promise to create the future trust in paragraph 1, then states 
in paragraph 2, the parties' agreement with respect to the distribution of 
the Property under the contemplated Trust Agreement. A reading of paragraphi 
and of its subparagraphs c !early shows the provisions of paragraph 2 to be tne 
dispositive provisions that the parties intended Rebecca Larrabee to include 
in the Trust Agreement she was to later execute. First, the distributive 
paragraph immediately follows the paragraph in which Rebecca Larrabee promised 
to create the Trust. Paragraph had provided that the transfer to the Trustee' 
was to be" •• for the use and benefit of Rebecca during her 1 ifetime, and for 
distribution to her children upon her death or after September 1, 1976, i~hicn<'' 
1 t " Pl · "ff' E h"b"t 4 p 2 Paragraph 2 then provides for ti· as occurs. a1nt1 s x 1 1 - , p •• 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
distribution to "said children". The distribution to "said children" in 
paragraph 2 obviously refers to the Trust distribution to Rebecca's children 
previously referred to in paragraph 1. It does not provide for a separate 
distribution which would occur outside of the Trust, Secondly, the termination 
dates of the Trust contained in paragraph 1 are again referred to paragraph 2(a) 
and paragraph 2(b). This further shows that the terms contained in paragraph 
2 of the Agreement were those terms the parties intended to be included in 
the separate Trust Agreement. 
Paragraph 2 shows that the parties were setting forth a plan of distribution 
under the Trust for which the children of Rebecca Larrabee were to share equally 
in the distribution of the Property subject to the specific distribution to 
Glenwood Larrabee. Glenwood was to "be entitled to the value of the property 
in excess of $62,000.00", under the terms of the Trust distribution, and the 
Trust's terms further granted him the right of first refusal and the right of 
purchase in order "to secure in him said interest". (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, 
p.~ These rights were directly tied to the Trust distribution by the clear 
and unambiguous language of the Agreement of September 7, 1973. Consequently, 
being tied to the Trust's distribution terms, the right of first refusal, and 
the right to purchase, did not arise unti 1 the revocable trust was created. 
It had no separate existence separate and apart from the contemplated Trust. 
Clearly, such was the intent of the parties and clearly, such is the proper 
interpretation as required by the language of the Agreement and the intent 
of the parties as ascertained from the instrument, itself. 
-9-
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Since the parties c ]early intended the provisions of th s 
e eptember ), 
1973 Agreement dealing with the contemplated Trust to create 
no present inter<o:' 
in the property, the trial court's interpretation of the Agreement to the 1 
con tr; 
is in error. The parties explicitly intended the right of first refusal and 
the right to purchase the property to be tied to the distribution terms of 
the revocable trust and explicitly intended those rights to arise only from 
the terms of the contemplated revocable trust. It was not intended that these 
rights arise from the Agreement of September 7, 1973. 
PO INT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FltJDltJG THAT GLENWOOD LARRABEE'S 
I tlTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WAS NOT TERMINATED BY THE REVOCATION 
OF THE TRUST. 
The trial court erred in finding that Glenwood Larrabee continued 
to have an interest in the property subsequent to the revocation of the Trust, 
Since the terms relating to the Trust and the Trust distribution contained 
in the Agreement of September 7, 1973, were only an agreement to make a 
trust containing those specified terms, only when Rebecca Larrabee executed 
the Trust of November 7, 1973, did Glenwood Larrabee obtain a vested interest 
in the property. However, that interest was subject to divestment through 
revocation of the Trust. When the Trust ~1as revoked, the interest was 
divested and terminated. The trial court erred in finding that the rights 
of Glenwood Larrabee continued to exist fol lowing revocation of the Trust. 
As explained in Point I above, the Agreement of September 7, 1973, 
contained a promise by Rebecca Larrabee to create a revocable trust at a 
later date con ta in ing spec if i c, d ispos it ive prov is ions set forth in the 
-10-
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Agreement. Rebecca Larrabee fully performed her promises, by executing the 
Trust Agreement, on November 7, 1973, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P. In the Trust 
Agreement, Rebecca "assigned, transferred, conveyed and de] ivered" to the 
joint "Trustee", Otto Blaine Larrabee, Jr., Glenwood 6. Larrabee, and Warren H. 
Larrabee, the property to which was referred in the Agreement of September 7, 1973. 
In continued performance of the Agreement of September 7, 1973, Rebecca Larrabee 
provided that the distribution, upon termination of the Trust would be in equal 
shares to her children: 
(O)r if any of said persons are deceased, to the surv1v1ng 
issue of them by right of representation, in equal shares 
provided that said equal shares shall be modified in accor-
dance with the provisions of an agreement between Trustor and 
her children, dated the 7th day of September, 1973 (a copy of 
which Agreement is attached to this Trust Agreement, and by 
reference is incorporated herein). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P, p. 2. The Trust Agreement further, in Article VIII, 
entitled "Power of Trustor to Amend or Revoke" states: 
/jotwi thstanding anything in this Trust Agreement to the 
contrary, Trustor will have the right at any time or times 
to amend any of the provisions of this Trust Agreement or 
to amend any Amendment thereto by an instrument in writing 
executed by Trustor, and delivered to Trustee; provided, 
however, that Tr us tor sha 11 not have the power to amend the 
Trust Agreement, in such a way as to increase the duties of 
Trustee or to impose any additional burdens on him, without 
the consent of Trustee. Truster shall have the right at any 
time or times to revoke this Trust Agreement in whole or in 
part, by an instrument in writing executed by Trustor and 
delivered to Trustee, upon paying a 11 sums due to Trustee and 
indemnifying Trustee against loss from liabilities lawfully 
incurred in the administration of the Trust. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P, p. 8. 
-11-
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In the interpretation of the Trust Agreement of November 7, 19 73 , 
and its relationship to the Agreement of September 7, 1973, the Utah Supreme, 
Court's recital of the rules of construction to be used with respect to 
Trusts stated in the case of Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah, 1974) 
be fol lowed. In the Makoff decision, the court stated: 
The general rules of construction of written instruments 
apply to the construction of trust instruments, and those 
rules require determination of the intention of the settlor 
where the creation of the trust is a unilateral matter. 
However, in case the trust is based on a written instrument, 
the intention of the settlor must be ascertained from the 
language thereof, and the court may not go outside of the 
language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the 
intent was. If the language is unambiguous, there is no need for 
wondering what the true intent may have been, and parole 
evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms set out. 
(Foot notes omitted.) 
528 P. 2d at 798. 
shoul:: 
With respect to the Trust Agreement of tJovember 7, I 973, a lack of 
recitals makes it difficult to ascertain the intent of the parties by lookin~ 
only at the terms of the Trust. However, the intent of the parties was 
unmistakably explained in the Agreement of September 7, 1973. The t~ 
agreements should be construed together. 
Where there are two or more instruments creating, defining 
or relating to the Trust, they may or should be construed together 
to effectuate the intention of the creator as where a trust 
instrument incorporates another instrument by reference, in which 
case, the instrument referred to wi 11 be construed as part of the 
first agreement, except to the extent that the instrument maybe 
inconsistent. 
90 CJS Trusts, Section 164. p. 32. 
-12-
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If both agreements are construed together, both are found to be 
entirely consistent with the expressed intention of the parties, The Agreement 
of September 7, I 973 contained a promise by Rebecca Larrabee to create a 
revocable trust in the future which would contain the dispositive provisions 
specified in the Agreement. The Trust of November 7, 1973, was executed by 
Rebecca Larrabee as the vehicle through which she performed that promise. 
There can be no question that the Trust contained the dispositive provisions 
specified in the Agreement for in creating the Trust, she incorporated the 
very provisions by attaching a copy of the Agreement and incorporating its 
terms by reference. Since the Trust was merely the vehicle for performance 
~the Agreement, the intent of the parties would have been identical with 
respect to both documents, The parties, at the time of the execution of the 
Trust, still wished: "To provide for the maintenance, operation and possible 
future disposition of the property". Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P, p. 2. 
The intent to provide for the possible future and distribution of 
the property c ]early coincides with the Agreement of the parties that the Trust 
be a revocable trust. The language of the Agreement referring to the creation 
of a revocable trust and the language contained in the revocable Trust, itself, 
is unambiguous. The 1 anguage in both agreements indicates that a conscious 
choice was made by the parties. They provided for the possible future 
disposition of the property through the use of a revocable trust as opposed to 
providing for the certain future distribution of the property through the use of 
an irrevocable trust. Since the Trust was revocable, its dispositive provisions 
were I ikewise revocable and since those provisions were not capable of independent 
existence outside the Trust Agreement, all interest set forth in the dispositive 
Provis ions ~Jere divested through the revocation. 
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The trial court, in finding the Glenwood Larrabee had an interest 
in the Property separate and apart from the Trust was reacting to an· 
1 rnaginea 
inequitable result which the Court felt would occur if the Court had found 
that Glenwood Larrabee's interest was destroyed by revocation. I f n re erring 
to Glenwood Larrabee, the trial court said: "He spent a lifetime in the 
building there, remodeled it, and certainly his efforts are entitled to 
some consideration." Transcript. p. 117. 
The court erred in concerning itself with the details of how Glenwooa 
Larrabee fared under the Agreement, instead of with the clear meaning of the 
language of the Agreement as intended by the parties. The Utah Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in Holley v. Federal American Partners, 29 Utah 2d 212, 
507 P.2d 381 (1973), where the Court explained: 
••• just how the parties fare under the contract is not 
the concern of the courts, but in the absence of some 
unconscionabi lity, it should be enforced according to the 
meaning of its terms as intended by the parties insofar 
as they can be ascertained. 
507 P. 2d at 383. 
Therefore, where the parties, as they have done here, clearly provide 
that the Trust is to be revocable, the Court must construe the Trust to be 
revocable. Since the distributive provisions set forth in the Agreement of 
September 7, 1973, are set out by the parties in such a way so as only to be 
effective if the Trust is in effect, the Court has no alternative but to find 
that it is the intent of the parties that the interests set forth in thedispo' 
provisions are terminated upon revocation of the Trust. The trial court 
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clearly erred in the Present case when it found that GI enwood Larrabee continued 
to own an interest in the dairy property after the revocation of the Trust. 
No interest was intended by the parties to be granted by the Agreement of 
September 7, I 973, because those provisions were merely a promise to create 
a future trust. Furthermore, revocation of the Trust terminated any interests 
granted by the Trust Agreement of November 7, 1973. This Court is urged to 
find that the revocation of the Trust Agreement of November 7, 1973, divested 
Glenwood Larrabee of any interest in the dairy property. 
CONCLUS IOIJ 
Through the Agreement of September 7, 1973, and the Trust of November 7, 
1973, the parties to the Agreements intended that Glenwood Larrabee be granted 
an interest in the dairy property only through the dispositive provisions of a 
future Trust. By providing that the Trust was to be revocable, the parties also 
intended that the dispositive provisions of the Trust would also be revoked, 
therefore extinguishing any interest in and to the property granted the 
beneficiaries of the Trust. The trial court clearly erred in finding that 
Glenwood Larrabee continued to have an interest in the Property after the 
revocation of the Trust. This Court is urged to give the Agreement in 
question the interpretation intended by the parties. This Court is urged 
to find that the Agreement of September 7, 1973, did not grant to Glenwood 
Larrabee or any other Trust beneficiary, an interest in the dairy property, and 
that when the interest was created at the time of the execution of the Trust 
of November 7, 1973, that interest was extinguished when the Trust was 
revoked. 
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~I 
Ro/ G. Haslam -
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